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Abstract.
Reliable authentication of communicating entities is essential for achieving security in a distributed computing environment. The design of such
systems as Kerberos, SPX and more recently KryptoKnight and Kuperee, have largely been successful in addressing the problem. The common element with these implementations is the need for a trusted thirdparty authentication service. This essentially requires a great deal of
trust to be invested in the authentication server which adds a level of
complexity and reduces system flexibility.
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties
was first suggested by M. Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons,"
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Vol 27, pp 256-267, 1983. In
this paper we revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely overlooked in
the past decade. In particular we present a novel approach to the authentication problem based on a service called Beacon which continuously
broadcasts certified nonces. We argue that this approach considerably
sUnplifies the solution to the authentication problem and we illustrate
the impact of such a service by "Beaconizing" the well know Needham
and Schroeder protocol. The modified protocol would be suitable for deployment at upper layers of the communication stack.

Term Index: Beacon, Authentication, Network Security, Information Security, Security Protocol.

1

Introduction

In the past thirty years the rapid evolution of electronic data communication
has been breath taking. This growth and reliance on electronic communication
has increased concern about data privacy and integrity. Much effort is currently
being devoted to providing security services for a variety of communication environments. Authentication is universally acknowledged as being essential for
secure communications in a distributed system.
Informally, authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communication to be able to verify that the message did come from the alleged sender. As
a further requirement, it is usual to expect such systems to perform verification
over an open insecure network. This requirement constrains the authentication
system in the following manner:
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Reliance must not be placed in the physical security of all hosts 10 the
distributed system.
It should be assumed that packets traveling along the network can be read,
modified and inserted with little effort by an adversary.
Trust cannot be based on the senders' address.
Trust cannot be based on the senders' operating system security.
Currently, the dominant authentication protocols employed in a client-server
environment use a broker to arbitrate between principals who wish to communicate. In such a scheme, a principal must first contact the broker to obtain
credentials which can be trusted by its communicating partner. The protocol will
typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic messages and the participant's
knowledge of some secret. Well known examples of such systems are Kerberos
[16,7,2]' SPX [17], KryptoKnight [8] and Kuperee [6].
In this paper we present a novel approach to the authentication problem for
a distributed computer system using a public key cryptographic system and we
introduce a new service called Beacon which has been inspired by Rabin [12]. A
Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, certified nonces which are accessible to
all hosts within the network. In section 3 we give a brief description of Rabin's
use of Beacons. In section 4 the approach taken in this paper is described.
As a means of contrasting the Beacon based approach to authentication with
the more established authentication protocols, in section 5 we "beaconize" the
very well known Needham and Schroeder public key protocol. We assume that
the reader is familiar with the basic philosophy of Needham and Schroeder. For
a complete description of the protocol we would direct the reader to [9].
In section 6 we discuss the advantages of the beaconized approach. The paper
finally closes in section 7 with some concluding remarks.

2

Conventions

Throughout this paper ~ertain terms are used which may appear to be ambiguous
or new to readers. In the following section the use of these terms, in the context
of this document, are stated. This should avoid any difficulty caused by their
being used differently elsewhere.
2.1

Terminology

A host is a computer with a unique address which is connected to a computer
network.
The user is the human being who is using some services provided by the network. All programs in the system are initiated by users. The main purpose of
authentication is to verify the identity of the users within a network.
A client is a program which runs on behalf of a user in order to request some
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service that is available on a remote host. Since the client runs on a user's behalf,
it assumes the user identity and privileges. Any action taken by a client is said
to have been carried out by the user.
The server is a program which provides a service to a client on the network.
It is usually installed by the system administrator and runs on behalf of the
system. A server remains active in a network for much longer than a client and
thus is given an identity. Each server is therefore registered with the system, in a
similar manner to a user, and must prove its identity before a client will accept it.
Any communicating network entity, that is client or server, can be referred to
as a principal.
A realm is organized in a hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to
domains in Internet. A single authentication server, be it a Beacon or Thirdparty Authenticator, is responsible for all local principals. This collection of
network entities, the authentication server and its clients, are referred to as a
realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service from a server within the same
realm would use the service to prove its identity.
2.2

Cryptographic Requirements

The Beacon based system relies on a public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic
system. Many such systems have been designed and examples of such schemes
can be found in [19, 15]. For the purpose of our discussion the system's cryptographic requirements can be simplified and kept generic.
A public key system differs from a secret key (or symmetric) system in that
each principal in the distributed system has a pair of keys. The calculation of
this private and public key pair, given the initial conditions, is easy. However,
it would be infeasible for an adversary who knows a public key to calculate the
secret key or the initial conditions. Each principal has a private key which is
kept secret and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key
is made available to all other principals. In the remainder of this paper "{} z"
means encipher with key Z. The private and public key pair will be denoted as
"X" and "Y" respectively and subscripts will be used to identify the associated
principal. Thus the Beacon would have a key pair XBN, YBN, the principal,
Alice, would have the pair XA, YA while Bob would have XB, YB.
The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentication, and integrity. Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations:

M = {{M}yBlxB
That is, suppose Alice wishes to send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then
Alice must have access to Bob's public key and encipher the message, thus:

c= {M}YB
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Alice sends Bob the cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ
his private key to decipher the message.

{C}XB = {{M}yBhB = M
The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys.
However, it would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the
private key· XB, ensuring secrecy. Now, since YB is publicly known, Bob has no
way of being certain of the sender's identity. Thus authenticity has not been
assured using this method.
Authentication, using a public key system, is satisfied by the following transformation.

Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob by using her private key, X A :
C= {MhA
Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by
deciphering the message using Alice's public key, YA , thus:

If the message is plain-text, Bob knows that C has in fact not been altered.
However, if the message, or any portion of the message, is a random string then
it may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message has not been altered
merely by examining it. For this reason it is more usual for Alice to employ a
suitable one-way hashing function (eg. [14, 18]) to produce a Message Digest
(MD). Alice would sign the MD with her private key and append it to the
message. On receiving the message, Bob is able to reproduce the MD in order to
confirm that the message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. Finally,
all three can be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob thus:

3

Rabin's Approach Using Beacons

The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer system
was first suggested by M. Rabin [12]. He defined a Beacon as emitting, at regular intervals, a random integer sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature
system. The integer would be selected randomly and uniformly within the range
1 to N, where N is publicly known. With this basic concept he proposed two
protocols based on a probabilistic approach, one for the signing of contracts and
the second for information disclosure. In the following section Rabin's use of
Beacons is illustrated by briefly outlining the contract signing protocol. For a
full account, the reader is referred to the original paper.
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Consider, Alice and Bob have negotiated a contract over a computer network
and are ready to exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and
they wish to use the network to make the exchange electronically. We can assume that the contracts can be signed by a suitable electronic signature scheme.
The problem addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the contract to
Bob, 'then Alice is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the opportunity
to look for a better deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument can be
made about Bob.

In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions:
- Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair which can
be used for signing messages and verifying signatures. The Beacon has the
private and public key pair XBN, YBN, Alice's keys are XA, YA and Bob's
are XB, YB. The public keys, YBN, YA and YB are widely known and are
available to the participants. Each participant's private key has been kept
secret and is known only to its owner.
- The Beacon broadcasts a token, T every ~ seconds and the next broadcast
will be at time t +~. The T has the following form:

T = {t, i}XBN
where t is the time at which the token was emitted and i is a randomly
selected integer between 1 and N. The value of N is publicly known. The
Beacon seals the token using its private key XBN.
- Alice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that:

C = h(contract)
where a suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract and
the obtained result is used to denote the contract.
- Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We will refer
to these agreements signed by Alice and Bob as PA and PB respectively. The
text of PAis as follows:
{If Bob can produce (e, T) signed by Alice and T signed by the Beacon for
some token T, then I, Alice will be committed to the contract as of the time
t mentioned in the token T. }XA
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged. Since
this agreement does not bind either party to the contract, it reasonable to
assume that this initial exchange will pass off without incident.
The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow
a timed sequence. The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit the
specified message within the allocated time. The exchange takes place in the
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time between Beacon broadcasts. This time ..:1 is divided in six equal segment.
The protocol is as follows:
l. t

?

time ~ t

+ ~..:1

2.

Alice => Bob: P A
Bob => Alice: PB

3. t

+ ~..:1 ?

time ~ t + 1..:1 Alice

4. t

+ 1..:1 ?

time ~ t + ~..:1 Bob => Alice: iB
i = iA + iBmodN

5.

=> Bob: iA

6. t + ~..:1 ? time ~ t + ~..:1 Alice => Bob: {C, i, t
7.

Bob

+ ..:1} XA

=> Alice: {C,i,t+..:1}XB

Within the first segment (steps 1 and 2) the two parties are required to
exchange the preliminary contract. In the next two segments both Alice and
Bob exchange random numbers which each has generated independently, that
is iA and iB. Each party is then able to calculate i. Finally, (steps 6 and 7)
the two parties sign and exchange the messages which could bind them to the
contract. These messages contain the contract name, C, and possibly the next
token. If neither party has cheated and the next token emitted by the Beacon
contains i, then both parties are committed to the contract at the same time. If
the next emitted token does not contain i, then neither party is committed and
steps 3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in such an exchange there
is a probability of 1/N that one of the parties could cheat successfully.

4

Beacons

Rabin's novel ideas on the use of beacons have been largely overlooked by the
research community during the past decade. We revive these ideas by transferring
them to the authentication problem. The following is a more detailed description
of the concept, feasibility and implementation of a Beacon.
A Beacon, within the context of this paper, is a service which is provided
by a secure host in a computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, at regular
intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a certified token. The emitted token would
be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host maintains a short list of
fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this service would be small as each
host is only required to listen for a short and relatively infrequent message.
4.1

Token

The token has the following form:
Ni, time,/i/e, {M D}XBN
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where:

Ni

-+

time
life
MD

-+

XBN

is a freshly generated nonce.
is the time at which the token was emitted.
-+ is the time after which the token will not be valid.
-+ is the message digest.
-+ is the Beacon's secret encryption key which is used to certify the
token.

Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting
the MD using the Beacon's public key. The MD ensures that the token has not
been tampered with. Since the token is signed with the Beacon's secret key it is
reasonable to assume the token originated from the Beacon. Each host is able to
main~ain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of currently valid tokens. Thus
these tokens are available to all principals to use in the authentication process.
4.2

Network Synchronization

There is reliance within a Beacon based system that each principal has access to
a stable clock and that these clocks are to some extent synchronized. Since the
life of a token can be relatively long, sayan hour, differences of a few seconds
between the hosts can be tolerated. In this section we examine the Internet's
Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is feasible to have much
closer synchronization between communication hosts.
Any attempt to synchronize communicating entities requires access to an
accurate standard. Since 1972 the time standard for the world has been based
on International Atomic Time which is currently maintained to an accuracy of
a few parts in 10 12 [1]. Many countries operate standard time and frequency
broadcast stations which collectively cover most areas of the world.
The network time protocol (NTP) is an Internet standard protocol [13] which
is used to maintain a network of time servers, accessible over normal Internet
paths. Even though transmission delays over Internet can vary widely, due to
fluctuations in traffic loads and dynamic message routing, NTP acts to provide global synchronization. NTP is built on Internet's User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) [11] which provides a connectionless transport mechanism.
The NTP system consists of a network of primary and an estimated total of
over 2000 secondary time servers. Primary time servers are directly synchronized
by reference source, usually a time code receiver, or a calibrated atomic clock.
Secondary time servers are synchronized by either a primary server or another
secondary time servers. Due to the wide dispersal of these servers, access is
available using some thousands of routes over hundreds of networks, making the
system very reliable.
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University
of Delaware, the institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are
synchronized using two primary servers and each other. The three campus servers
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in turn provide synchronization for department servers which then deliver time
to remaining hosts. In such a configuration, several hundred synchronization
milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon.
4.3

Creating a Beacon

As stated above, a Beacon is a service which, at regular intervals, emits a token
which can be authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible to all hosts
on the network and each host is required to maintain a short list offresh tokens.
Since the broadcast is short and relatively infrequent, implementation is quite
feasible in either software or hardware. Algorithm 1 shows the functionality.

Algorithm 1 Beacon(}
1. t = clock + Ll

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Nj =GO
M Dj = h(t, life, Nd
T= t,life,Nj,{MDdxBN
while (clock < t) wait
broadcast(T)
goto(l)

end

The aigorithm begins by setting, t, the time for the next broadcast. Next, the
token is constructed prior to broadcasting (steps 2 to 4). The cryptographically
strong pseudo-random generator, GO, is used to create a nonce Nj. The final
component required to create the token is the message digest (MD). The oneway hash function, h, is employed to compress the bit string created by the
concatenation of the broadcast time, t, the token life, I and the nonce Nj. The
output, which is of a fixed length, is used as the MD. The token, T consists of
the MD, M Dj, signed with the Beacon's private key and the other three fields.
The token is broadcast at time t (steps 5 and 6). The algorithm is then repeated
(step 7).
4.4

One-time Token

It is generally accepted that the beneficial features of a public key cryptosystem
are bought at the expense of speed. At present it is not feasible to use a public
key system for bulk encryption. In practice, however, it is quite desirable to
create a hybrid system in which a public key system is used for authentication
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and distribution of a session key. The session key would then be used by the two
principals to communicate securely using a symmetric key system.
With a Beacon based system, a "one-time token" can be used to simplify
the process. By one-time token it is meant that a token emitted by the Beacon
can be used only once to obtain service from a particular server; much like an
admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been presented, it is marked
and will not be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion. The process
of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining a database of
prior requests. The use of one-time tokens eliminates the possibility of a replay
attack and thus simplifies the process.
To illustrate the process consider a very simple case. Alice wishes to communicate securely with Bob. In this case Bob can be thought of as being the
server and Alice the client. Assume, for simplicity, that Alice and Bob communicated yesterday and they are both certain that each knows the other's public
key. Such an occurrence is not uncommon in a distributed system since most
principals communicate within a small group and a cache is commonly used to
store commonly used keys. The process has two steps:

1. Alice => Bob: Alice,Nj, {KA,BhB' {M D}XA
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her
n'ame, the nonce N j , and a session key KA,B. The session key is created by
Alice, and will be used with a symmetric cryptographic system to secure
subsequent messages. Since the session key is the secret in the message, it
is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, YB . The nonce,
Nj, is selected at random by Alice from the list of active tokens and ensures
message freshness. The message integrity is protected using a MD which is
signed by Alice.
2. Bob => Alice: {NdKA,B
Bob, having received the request for communication, can confirm that the
message did come from Alice and that it has not been altered. The freshness
of the message is guaranteed by the use of a nonce, Nj, which was recently
broadcast by the Beacon. Since the nonce can be used only once there is
of course a finite probability that the nonce chosen. by the Alice from the
active list has already been presented to Bob by someone else. In such a
case the request would be rejected and Alice would have to re-apply with
another nonce. The probability of such a collision occurring is dependent on
factors such as network load, token frequency and token life. In practical
applications the additional load caused by this effect should be minimal.
Having received a session key which he can trust, Bob completes the protocol
by authenticating himself to Alice. He enciphers the nonce with a session key
and sends it to Alice. Since only Bob could have obtained session key, the
message proves Bob's identity.
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5

Beaconizing the Needham and Schroeder Protocol

The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol [9] is arguably one of the best known
authentication and key distribution protocols. It has been the basis of a number
of systems which use the nonce to prove freshness. In 1981 Denning and Sacco [5}
pointed out a weakness in the NS protocol and suggested the use of time-stamped
certificates to guard against a replay attack. Since that time authentication
protocols have been divided into two groups, one preferring the use of nonces
and the other preferring time-stamps.
In this section we briefly outline the NS protocol using asymmetric keys.
Next we will describe the weakness pointed out by Denning and Sacco and their
solution to the problem. For a complete description the reader is directed to
the original papers [9J and [5J. We will then modify the NS protocol to take
advantage of a Beacon. We will show that the modified protocol simplifies the
solution to the authentication problem and has advantages over both the NS
protocol and modified protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco.
5.1

Needham and Schroeder Protocol

The NS protocol requires a trusted authentication server (AS) to establish trust
between two principals wishing to communicate. Each principal within a realm
which is dominated by a particular AS, is required to register his or her public
key with that AS. To establish trust between principals, the AS must have the
trust of all principals within its realm, to maintain and distribute these keys
reliably.
The NS protocol can be divided in to distinct sections. The following illustrates the two protocol sections.
Public Key Distribution Protocol
Consider the situation where Alice wishes to communicate with Bob but is not
certain of his public key. Thus she must apply to the AS to obtain Bob's public
key. The steps required are as follows:

1. Alice => AS: Alice,Bob
Alice sends a message to the AS requesting the public key. The requesting
message is in clear text and is the names of both principals.
2. AS => Alice: {Bob,YB}xAs
The AS responds with a message containing the requested public key and
is signed with the AS's private key. The message contains the name of the
key's owner which allows Alice to verify that the reply contains the correct
key.
This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance that the request was
initiated by Alice nor of the freshness of the AS's reply.
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Connection Protocol
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain any required keys from
the AS, the following are the steps required for them to authenticate each other
in order to establish a conversation. Alice is the initiator.

=> Bob: {NA,AlicehB
Alice is able initiate the authentication process by sending Bob a message
which contains a nonce, N A, and her identity. The message is enciphered
with Bob's public key, YB, which means only Bob will be able to access N A .
2. Bob => Alice: {NA,NBh"
Qn receiving the message, Bob obtains the nonce N A. However, Bob cannot
be certain of freshness nor of the identity of the actual sender. To verify
identity and guard against a replay attack, Bob generates a nonce, N B, and
sends it to Alice. Bob also proves his identity to Alice by including N A in
the reply. The message to Alice is encrypted with Alice's public key.
3. Alice => Bob: {NBhB
As a final step in this authentication process, Alice proves her identity to
Bob by returning NB'
1. Alice

5.2

Denning and Sacco's Modification

In [5] Denning and Sacco analyzed the protocol and pointed out that it is only
secure while there hasn't been a key compromise. The solution suggested by
Denning and Sacco uses time stamped certificates. The form of these certificates
is as follows:

where:

P

-+

Yp
T

-+
-+

XAS -+

is
is
is
is

the
the
the
the

principal's identification.
public key belonging to principal P.
time at which the certificate was issued.
AS's private key which is used to sign the certificate.

The Denning and Sacco modified protocol combines the authentication and
key distribution into a single process. That is, if the principals are able to obtain
public keys reliably and message freshness can be guaranteed, then the communicating principals are able to use the features of their public key cryptographic
system to authenticate messages. The steps of the modified protocol are as follows:

=> AS: Alice,Bob
As before, Alice sends a request for two certificates, one containing Bob's
public key and the other containing Alice's public key.
2. AS => Alice: GA,GB
The AS responds with a message containing two signed certificates. GA contains Alice's public key and GB contains Bob's.
.
1. Alice
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3. Alice::} Bob: GA,GB
Alice initiates the conversation with Bob by sending the certificates. Since
the certificates are signed by the AS and contain a time-stamp to prove
freshness, Bob is able to trust them.
In [5] Denning and Sacco point out that in order for Alice to obtain the
certificates and deliver them to Bob, the certificates must have a lifetime. By
this it is meant that the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The
length of the certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as the synchronization discrepancy between hosts and communication delays. During this period
the protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate lifetime is
kept short, the protocol reduces the likelihood of a replay attack, but does not
eliminate it.
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able
to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short
to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all conversations.
5.3

A Beacon Based Approach

We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and modify the NS protocol to take advantage of the new service. As in the unmodified NS protocol, the
beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections. The first enables a principal to obtain another's public key. The second, the connection protocol, is used
by a principal to initiate a conversation. We end this section by modifying the
connection protocol to include the distribution of a symmetric session key. Once
again we will use the over worked principals, Alice and Bob, to demonstrate the
protocol features.
Public Key Distribution Protocol
The following are the steps required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key.
1. Alice::} AS: Alice,Bob
Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and requesting
Bob's public key. The message is in plain-text and only contains the two
identities.
2. AS::} Alice: Bob,YB,N,,{MD}xAs
Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, the message is not
enciphered. As in the NS protocol the message contains the requested public
key and the name of the key's owner. This ensures that the request made by
Alice has not been altered. The nonce, N" is picked randomly by the Beacon
from the list of active tokens and is used to guarantee that this message is
not a replay. The message integrity is ensured by the MD which is signed by
the AS.
Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "one-time token" , if N,
has previously been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and consequently the AS's reply would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice would
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have to reinitated the request. The probability of such a collision occurring, in
a practical application, is quite low.
Connection Protocol
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys, the
following is the step required for Alice to initiate a conversation.
1. Alice => Bob: Alice,Nj,{MD}x"
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her
name and the nonce, Nj. The nonce is selected at random by Alice from the
list of active tokens and is used to ensures message freshness. The message
integrity is protected using a MD which is signed by Alice. Since the message
contains no secret information it is not encrypted with Bob's public key.

If Nj has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked
and the request for connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob would
reply with an error message and Alice would select another nonce and reinitiate
the request.
Distribution of a Symmetric key.
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. Thus,
it is quite desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system is
used for authentication and distribution of a session key. The session key would
then be used by the two principals to communicate securely using a symmetric
key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the two principals, Alice and
Bob, to share a session key.
1. Alice => Bob: Alice,Nk, {KA,B}YB' {MD}x A
Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message containing
her name, the nonce N.c, and the session key, KA,B. Once again Nk is used
to ensure freshness. Since the session key is the only secret in the message,
it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, YB.The message
integrity is protected using a MD which is signed by Alice.

5.4

Attacks on the Modified Protocol

The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be broken
up in to six categories. In the following section the effects of these are discussed
in turn.
- In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of the
principals in the system. Since the principal's secret key is used to prove its
identity, for such an attack to succeed an adversary would require knowledge
of such a key. If a principal's secret key were to be compromised, it is possible
that an adversary could masquerade as that principal while the problem was
undetected and before a new key was distributed. However, unlike the case
of the NS protocol, an adversary is unable to block the distribution of new
keys.
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By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes to gain
some advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key protocol does not
require the transmission of any secret information, such an attack cannot
succeed. In the case of the hybrid system, the session key is enciphered.
Thus an adversary would require knowledge of the deciphering key.
- The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge
by retransmitting a message which was intercepted earlier. There are three
distinct areas in which a replay attack could be attempted. They are:
1. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The purpose of this message is to
broadcast a unique token to all hosts on the network. Since the token has
a finite life, if an expired token were retransmitted, the message would
simply be discarded. Replaying the message before the token expires
gains no advantage for the adversary as the duplicate token would be
detected and thus discarded.
2. The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution
portion of the protocol. The protocol consists of two message. The effect
of replaying these would be:

• The protocol is initiated by a principal request another principal's
public key. The request is in plain-text and is directed to the AS.
Since the information is public and service is freely available, the
adversary can gain nothing new .
• The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. Since the
message is unique; in that it contains the name of the recipient, a
one-time nonce and is signed by the sender, a replayed message would
be detected.
3. The final message that could be replayed is the request for connection.
This message is also unique, thus a replayed message would be detected
and the attack would fail.
A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets as they
travel across the computer network. For such an attack to succeed the change
must be undetected. Such an attack would be futile because the recipient of
a message is always able to detect any changes.
An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to expire
and prevent the principal from completing the authentication process. Such
an attack would have the same results as "denial of service".
A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary who is able to
hinder communications in some manner. Detection and countering of such
an attack is best dealt with by other means, such as statistical monitoring
of the network.

6

Discussion on Advantages

At present there are two dominant approaches to guaranteeing message freshness
within authentication schemes; the method favored by Needham and Schroeder
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requires that principals generate and exchange nonces. The second method which
has been suggested by Denning and Sacco makes use of a timestamp within
certificates that are fabricated by the authentication server. In this section we
discuss the five main advantages gained by the use of a beaconized approach.
We will compare our approach with these well known protocols.
- The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol has been the basis for a number of systems. The approach taken by them requires principals, wishing to
establish a conversation, to engage in a three step message exchange. The
purpose of this exchange is to ascertain the identity of the other principal
and to guard against a replay attack. The distribution of public keys is provided by a trusted authentication server, AS. In the worst case, where both
principals require the services of the AS to obtain public keys, the protocol
requires a total of seven messages to be exchanged.
In Denning and Sacco's modified protocol (DS) principals are required to obtain certificates from the authentication server. One benefit of this approach
is that the number of messages required to initiate a conversation is reduced
to three.
The beaconized protocol allows principals with cached keys to initiate a conversion with a single message. The procedure for a principal to acquire the
public key of a communicating partner requires two steps.

- In [5], Denning and Sacco pointed out that the NS protocol is vulnerable to
a replay attack in the event that a principal's key is compromised. To over
come this difficulty, they suggested the use of time-stamped certificates. The
resulting protocol requires a principal who wishes to initiate a conversation,
to contact the AS to obtain two certificates; one for each principal. Each
certificate has a finite life and contains a public key. During the period between the certificate being issued and expiring, the DS protocol is also is
vulnerable to a replay attack. Kerberos [16, 7, 2] is the best known implementation of timestamp certificates and uses the symmetric key version of
the DS protocol [5]. In practice the duration of an authenticator within Kerberos is typically five minutes [3]. The DS protocol does not eliminate the
possibility of a replay attack, but reduces it.
The beaconize protocol's use of one-time token eliminates the possibility of
a replay attack without the increased steps that are suggested within the NS
protocol.
- Another feature of the DS protocol is that principals are no longer able to
cache commonly used keys. The beaconized approach, like the NS protocol,
allows principals to cache commonly used keys which results in the reduction
of network traffic and load on the authentication server.
- Within the DS protocol the certificate lifetime must be kept short to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate most (if not all) attempts to communicate. Consequently, a greater amount of trust is invested
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in the AS and the realm now has a single point of failure.
The beaconized approach reduces the role of the AS to simply being a distributor of public keys which was suggested in the original NS protocol.
- In response to the criticism made in [5] Needham and Schroeder suggested a
modification to their original protocol [10]. The revised NS protocol guards
against the redistribution of a compromised key by requiring the principals
to include a nonce in their communications with the authentication server.
The purpose of this nonce is to reassure each principal that the message
received from the authentication server is fresh. This revision adds a small
amount of load to principals engaged in initiating a conversation.
In contrast the beaconized approach does not require each principal to have
the ability to generate nonces. It would be fair to say that this advantage
is offset within the overall system by the additional load caused by the introduction of a Beacon. However, within a practical environment there are
likely to be principals of varying abilities and it would be preferable if the
generation of good quality nonces was provided by a single service.

7

Concluding Remarks

In this paper we have attempted to revive Rabin's ideas regarding beacons and
have shown that the use of Beacons can simplify authentication in a distributed
system.
The fundamental difference between our approach and that more traditionally taken is the use of a Beacon to deliver a "one-time token" to each host.
This simplifies the authentication process by taking advantage of the features
of a public key cryptographic system. In contrast to the modification proposed
by Denning and Sacco, the beaconized approach eliminates the possibility of a
replay attack, allows principals to cache commonly used keys and preserves the
role of the AS as a distributor of public keys.

8
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